Security Lessons Learned Building Concept Apps for webinos by Faily, Shamal & Lyle, J.
Security Lessons Learned Building Concept
Apps for webinos
Shamal Faily
Software Systems Research Centre
School of Design, Engineering & Computing
Bournemouth University
Poole, DH12 5BB
UK
sfaily@bournemouth.ac.uk
John Lyle
Department of Computer Science
University of Oxford
Wolfson Building, Parks Road
Oxford, OX1 3QD
UK
firstname.surname@cs.ox.ac.uk
Concept applications provide a means for tackling security infrastructure problems. Not only do they provide
feedback to infrastructure design, they can also inform subsequent research activities. However, to directly
influence the architectural design of infrastructure, designers need to engage in the engineering of apps,
rather than just their broad design. By doing so, additional problems can be identified that might otherwise
be missed using human-centered design alone. In this paper, we describe four security lessons learned from
engineering the Kids in Focus concept app for the EU FP 7 webinos project. These illustrate how detailed
design activities can highlight broader infrastructure problems that might otherwise have gone unnoticed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As we become more reliant on mobile apps, it is
easy to forget how dependent they are on software
infrastructures. Infrastructures like App Stores are
not prominent, but are becoming increasingly
important for fostering software ecosystems. Other
examples include the software libraries connecting
end-users to remotely connected services. Our
dependency on such infrastructures is not purely
functional; we also have implicit security and privacy
requirements that we expect to hold when directly or
indirectly using them.
Software infrastructures are difficult to validate
without creating apps that use them. Even then,
while missing or broken functionality might be easy
to spot, security problems are harder to identify.
Security vulnerabilities in apps may not properly
reflect vulnerabilities in the infrastructure they use.
Moreover, the absence of known security problems
in an app today does not mean latent vulnerabilities
in the infrastructure won’t be found by an attacker
tomorrow.
Concept applications are useful for providing
feedback to the design of infrastructures (Edwards
et al. 2003). Additionally, as concept designs
such as Dynabook have suggested, even if these
applications are never built, they can still influence
other design activities (Stolterman and Wiberg
2010). Concept app design focuses on the interfaces
between infrastructure and application, and the
match between conceptual models and functionality
(Edwards et al. 2010). However, Edwards et al.
claim that directly influencing the architecture of
the infrastructure requires engagement with the
technical specialists that have traditionally led design
discussions. This engagement includes addressing
quality concerns, such as security, that are often
sacrificed during the early stages of design. One
approach for doing this is to try engineering,
rather than lightly prototyping, a concept app.
Attempting to develop non-trivial applications not
only exposes some of the user and application
developer expectations of infrastructures, it also
suggests further opportunities for tackling broader
problems that may not have otherwise come to light.
In this paper we describe four security lessons
learned from engineering the Kids in Focus concept
app for the EU FP 7 webinos project. These illustrate
how detailed design activities can highlight broader
infrastructure problems that might otherwise have
gone unnoticed.
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2. INTRODUCING WEBINOS AND KIDS IN
FOCUS
webinos is a software infrastructure for running
web applications across different device platforms
(Fuhrhop et al. 2012) including mobile handsets,
TVs, in-vehicle infotainment systems, and Internet
of Things devices. The specification of webinos was
informed by human-centered design activities, such
as the creation of personas (webinos Consortium
2011b), scenarios (webinos Consortium 2012),
and the integration of these activities into the
specification of webinos (Faily et al. 2012).
To further manifest ideas about how webinos might
be used by the personas, we developed a concept
app called Kids in Focus. This app is a children’s
card game designed to be played on in-vehicle,
mobile devices, and TVs. The game involves a child
playing cards with a remotely connected babysitter.
By playing with the child, the babysitter ensures
that a parent or guardian driving the car will not be
distracted during long car journeys.
Once a specification for Kids in Focus had been
created (webinos Consortium 2011a), development
was carried out by a small team of developers and
user interface designers. This team was supported
by security and usable security researchers involved
in both the human-centered and architectural design
of webinos. The source code for Kids in Focus is
available online via GitHub (webinos Consortium
2013c).
3. LESSONS LEARNED
Kids in Focus has been developed in parallel with
other webinos project activities since November
2011. The sections below summarise four security
lessons learned so far in building this concept
application.
3.1. Children are security stakeholders too
Surprisingly for a concept app designed for children,
there were few insights available to developers
about how children might be affected by webinos.
Moreover, although a persona – Helen (webinos
Consortium 2013b) – had been created to represent
the mother of a young child, the development team
had nothing other than assumptions to guide their
thinking about child-game interaction. In hindsight,
this was a surprising omission because children and
cars are two of the most precious things an average
person is likely to be responsible for.
Because none of the developers involved with
concept app development were parents, we created
a new persona to understand how children might
interact with Kids in Focus. After interviewing project
team members who were also parents of young
children, we quickly developed a persona for Eric:
the youngest son of Helen (webinos Consortium
2013a). By using both this persona and a premortem
scenario (Faily et al. 2012) to envisage ways that
Eric might be harmed as a result of a Kids in
Focus security breach, we identified vulnerabilities
in the way the concept app captured and managed
analytics data.
3.2. Security helps envisioning
The developers found it easy to envisage Helen
driving a car, and Eric playing a game in the back
seat; several scenarios describing the parent and
child interaction with Kids in Focus were described
in (webinos Consortium 2011a). However, many
unexpected aspects of how Kids in Focus might
be used were not apparent until people considered
the security and privacy implications of setting up
and playing games. For example, we envisaged that,
before starting any game, webinos would check
a remote player had permission to access the
resources necessary to interact with a Kids in Focus
game. However, it wasn’t until this precise detail was
specified that it occurred to the developers that the
setup might be too involved for Helen.
Given all the issues Helen needs to address at
home before setting out on her journey, methodically
following this process in advance seemed unlikely.
Instead, we concluded that Helen would instead let
Eric watch a movie or play with a more traditional,
physical travel game instead; Kids in Focus would
then only be setup on an ad-hoc basis some way
into a journey once Eric was bored of his planned
activities.
3.3. User accounts are dead, long live user
accounts
webinos facilitated the setup of a “personal zone”
of different devices. This allowed Helen to use
her mobile phone to control settings on the in-
vehicle system Eric used to play Kids in Focus.
Conceptually, Kids in Focus also provided a vehicle
for thinking about how devices in Helen’s personal
zone might interact with devices used in the personal
zone of the remote babysitter Eric was playing with.
Tablets and other mobile devices tend to assume
that one person is the owner and user of the device
at all times. However, when devices are shared
between parents and children, this is not the case.
User authentication solutions are slowly appearing
in mobile handsets, but not in a standardized
manner, and not in a way that is well understood
by users or developers. As we discovered when
2
Security Lessons Learned Building Concept Apps for webinos
Faily • Lyle
building Kids in Focus, this meant that a cross-
platform application needed to be designed with
no assumption about who the current user is. This
did, however, present opportunities to think about
how local device authentication might be tailored to
the application in question, to afford a more usable
authentication experience.
3.4. Convention is sacrificed for innovation
Developing concept applications highlighted uncon-
sidered security issues. The development process
also indirectly introduced tensions when deciding
how limited security manpower should be spent.
At a project review where Kids in Focus was
presented, an idea for modifying the webinos access
control framework was proposed. The proposal
entailed re-directing permission prompts that might
otherwise appear on Eric’s tablet to Helen’s phone
instead. This idea drove discussions within the
project about analogies between this approach
and “Bring your own device” policies found in
commercial environments, and possible solutions for
implementing this idea. Tackling the problems would
have led to security innovation; this excited many
on the project who wanted to develop prototypes to
explore the options available.
Dedicating resources to building these prototypes
would not have been possible without spending man-
power earmarked for implementing other planned
security functionality. However, while the idea ap-
peared to be neither urgent nor important, it was
impossible to say if this was actually the case. This
was because the idea was not found using the
security and usability design methods used to elicit,
analyse, and mitigate other risks addressed by the
webinos architecture. Retrospectively analysing the
design of Kids in Focus was also infeasible because
the manpower was unavailable for carrying out this
work.
This lesson reinforces not only the disruptive nature
of security (Faily and Fle´chais 2010), but also the
value tensions between security innovations and
secure systems.
4. CONCLUSION
Software infrastructures are difficult to envisage
without the aid of concept applications. However,
when designers and developers join forces to
tackle implementation problems in their construction,
additional insights can be gleaned about the human
implications of such systems.
In this paper we presented four security lessons
learned developing the Kids in Focus concept
application for webinos. These lessons have
subsequently been used to inform the design of
webinos platform. For example, we are currently
informing the security testing for the webinos policy
management architecture (Lyle et al. 2012) based on
how Helen and Eric interact with Kids in Focus during
a long car journey.
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